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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE YELLOW SUBMARINE STEERS CLEAR OF U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW" THE NINTH CIRCUIT REEXAMINES THE DOCTRINE OF
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.' the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deprived U.S.
copyright holders of a significant tool for redressing infringement"
occurring wholly abroad but authorized from within the Umted
States. At first glance, the Ninth Circuit's decision appears to
strike a devastating blow to copyright holders; however, a closer
examination reveals that the Subafilms decision actually
strengthens worldwide intellectual property right protection. The
Ninth Circuit made the correct decision for two important reasons.
First, the Subafilms decision eliminated a troublesome paradox
in the application of U.S. copyright law. Prior to Subafilms,
individuals could be liable for contributory infringement even in
the absence of primary infringement.' The elimination of this
paradox marks a return to the traditional application of the
doctrine of contributory infringement.
Second, the Subafilms decision embodied respect for
worldwide protection schemes, including the Berne Convention4
and the Umversal Copyright Convention (UCC).5  The Ninth
1. 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. CtL 512 (1994).
2. Infringement is "a violation of a law, regulation, contract or right." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 780 -(6th ed. 1990). This Comment discusses contributory infringement.
"[Olne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer." Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159,
1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971).
3. See Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that mere domestic authorization of "infringement" abroad is sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a plaintiff bringing a claim under U.S. copyright
law).
4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986,
102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1972) (amended 1988) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
5. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2732, 753 U.N.T.S. 368
[hereinafter UCC].
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Circuit declined to apply U.S. copyright law outside U.S. borders.6
This "hands off" approach gives the Berne Convention and other
agreements room to grow and develop. In the long run, strong
multilateral agreements born of international consensus are
preferable to a U.S.-imposed system of protection.
The underlying controversy in Subafilms involved foreign
videotape distribution rights to the 1966 animated feature film,
Yellow Submarine. A joint venture consisting of the musical
group, The Beatles, acting through Subafilms, Ltd. (Subafilms), and
the Hearst Corporation (Hearst) produced the film.8  United
Artists Corporation, MGM-Pathe Communication's (MGM)
predecessor in interest, financed and distributed the film pursuant
to an arrangement with Hearst.'
Because this joint venture preceded the dramatic rise in the
home-video market, the parties did not provide for video distribu-
tion rights.'0 The ownership of these rights, therefore, was
unclear." Despite this uncertainty, MGM authorized third parties
to distribute video copies of Yellow Submarine.2 Subafilms
brought suit to assert its ownership claim over the foreign and
domestic video distribution profits. 3
The district court determined that Subafilms owned the
distribution rights under the original agreement 14 and that MGM
had infringed those rights.I" Consequently, MGM was liable to
Subafilms for profits stemming from MGM's authorization to third
parties to distribute Yellow Submarine."6 MGM's liability to
Subafilms for the foreign profits lies at the heart of the Subafilms
6. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088,1097 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
7. Id. at 1089; YELLOW SUBMARINE (United Artists 1966).
8. Subafllms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., Nos. 91-56248, 91-56379,91-
56289, 1993 WL 39269, at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993), vacated in part, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
15. Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1090. The district court awarded Subafilms $2,228,000.00 in
compensatory damages apportioned equally between the foreign and domestic distribution
proceeds. Id.
16. Subaflms, 1993 WL 39269, at *6-7.
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controversy.17
The Ninth Circuit's initial review of the district court affirmed
the damages award; however, Subafilms' victory was short-lived.
The Ninth Circuit reheard the case and reexamined the doctrine of
contributory infringement, wich served as the basis for MGM's
liability.19 The court concluded that m order to impose this type
of third party liability upon MGM, some legally cogmzable
underlying infringement must exist.2" MGM's conduct consisted
solely of permitting others to distribute the film overseas. 2' The
Ninth Circuit held that such authorization alone was insufficient
activity to trigger application of U.S. copyright law. 2 The Ninth
Circuit was careful to linut its holding to situations with such
minimal domestic conduct as was present m Subafilms. 3
Contributory infringement is a common law doctrine.
Litigants have invoked this doctrine in disputes covering a wide
17. The Ninth Circuit reversed the award of damages stemming from foreign
distribution of the film. The court, however, left the damages for domestic distribution
intact because the district court had found that domestic distribution and performance of
the film were unauthorized and thus in violation of Subafilms' exclusive rights under 17
U.S.C. § 106. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1098.
18. Subafinms, 1993 WL 39269, at *7.
19. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1090-95 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
20. Id. at 1090. The only conduct that could constitute direct infringement occurred
abroad and consequently is beyond the reach of U.S. copyright law. Id. at 1094. See infra
part III.E.1.
21. Subafims, 24 F.3d at 1094.
22. Federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for copyright cases. 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993). If a court concludes that no domestic act of infringement has
occurred, the court has no constitutional power to act. De Bardossy v. Puski, 763 F Supp.
1239,1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67,72 (2d Cir.
1988). Any fundamental change in the reach of subjpct matter jurisdiction, such as the
Subaflims decision, is significant because lack of such jurisdiction forms the basis for a
motion to dismiss. FED. R. Civ. P 12. Moreover, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
never waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal. Update Art, 843 F.2d at 72.
Thus, defendants to contributory infringement actions have a powerful new weapon in their
arsenal.
23. Subafllms, 24 F.3d at 1090 n.3. "For the purposes of this decision, we assume, as
apparently the panel did, that each of the defendants made a relevant 'authorization' within
the United States, and that the acts of authorization consisted solely of entering into
licensing agreements." Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's allegations that the
plaintiffs had actually reproduced the film's prints in the United States as preparation for
distribution abroad. This is significant because it leaves open the possibility that the Ninth
Circuit will accept the Second Circuit's "predicate act" doctrine. See infra part IV
(discussing the various alternative remedies available to copyright holders after the
Subaflims decision).
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variety of subjects: "James Bond" films,24 record players,
refrigerants,26 heaters,27  shrimp devemers, videotape recor-
ders,29 newspaper 'prmting plates,30 and video games.
31
This Comment analyzes the doctrine's application m these
cases and compares its early use to its modern application m U.S.
copyright law. Part II of this Comment discusses U.S. copyright
law prior to Subafilms, including the 1976 amendment to the
Copyright Act32 and the 1988 decision to accede to the Berne
Convention.33  Part II also examines the principle of national
treatment, a central theme of the Berne -Convention and other
multilateral treaties.. Part III surveys the development of the
doctrine of contributory infringement. It traces the doctrine's
origins in early tort law, its initial use, and the eventual split that
differentiated its application in the copyright context from other
areas such as 'trademark and patent law. Part IV ascertains the
alternative remedies available to copyright holders in light of the
Subafilms decision. Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit's
decision marks a return to a traditional application of third party
liability; moreover, it rededicates the Umted States to a stronger
worldwide intellectual protection scheme.
II. U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Simultaneous Development of Federal & State Protection
Schemes
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to "secur[e] for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries" m order to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."' Congress first legislated
24. Danjaq v. MGM/UA Communications, Co., 773 F Supp. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
25. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909).
26. Carbice v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931).
27. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668 (1944).
28. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972).
29. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
30. Harper v. Shoppel, 28 F 613, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
31. Lewis Galoob Toys, v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1992).
33. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat.
2853, 2853 (1988).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This express.grant of power allows Congress to enact
copyright laws regulating domestic but not foreign activity. This narrow authority stands
in contrast to Congress's ability to regulate trademarks pursuant to the Commerce Clause
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in the area of copyright law in 1790,35 but the laws have changed
dramatically since then, transforming the Umted States "from a
copyright piracy haven into the foremost champion of intellectual
property protection.,
36
The first two centuries of U.S. copyright law afforded authors
two sources of domestic protection for their works: state common
law protection was available upon the creation of the work37 and
federal statutory protection was triggered upon its publication. 8
The pre-1978 scheme worked as follows:
a manuscript of a novel completed in 1970 would, at creation,
automatically enjoy common law protection of the state m which
it was composed, which protection would continue m perpetuity
or until publication, at which time it would be forfeited;
however, if the statutory formalities in effect at the tune of
publication were satisfied, federal protection would then begin
for a set term of years.39
This dual system of copyright law abruptly ended when Congress
passed the Copyright Act of 197640 and effectively preempted
state copyright law for causes of action arising after January 1,
of the Constitution. Id. cl. 3. Congress may use the "substantial effects" test to determine
that a wide variety of activity has an effect on interstate commerce and, thus, is the proper
subject of Congressional regulation. Congress's ability to regulate in the area of copyright
protection is much narrower. See Neil A. Smith, Obtaining Trademark and Copyright
Enforcement in the United States for Infrngemeng Abroad, 393 PRAc. L. INST. 553, 581
(1994).
Extraterritorial protection against infringement outside the U.S. is less efficacious
under copyright law than under trademark law. One reason is the Lanham Act
is grounded in the commerce power of Congress, which has been expansively
interpreted by the courts, whereas copyright law is derived from an explicit
constitutional provision in Article I, Section 8. Thus, under the Lanham Act, the
plaintiff may recover even when there is no domestic act of infringement, but
under copyright law, foreign activities are 'not actionable unless a part of, or a
consequence of, an act of infringement occurring within the United States.'
Id. (quoting Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team, GmbH, 757 F Supp. 1062, 1071 (N.D.
Cal. 1991)).
35. 1 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT at OV-1 (1994); Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
36. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at OV-1 n.1. See also leonard D. DuBoff
et al., Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has United States Participation in the Berne
Convention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential?, 4 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. LJ. 203, 209-10 (1985).
37. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at OV-3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).
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B. The United States Accedes to the Berne Convention
Mere, domestic protection for authors becomes less adequate
as technological advances make worldwide distribution of works
more feasible.42 Therefore, international agreements are essential
to any country seeking comprehensive intellectual property rights
protection. No single source of international copyright protection
exists for authors seeking protection from foreign infringement of
their works. Copyright protection for U.S. authors is available
generally in foreign countries from three sources: "bilateral
copyright treaties, bilateral copyright 'arrangements' (such as the
-exchange of diplomatic notes and Presidential proclamations
characterizing U.S. copyright relations before the 1952 Umversal
Copyright Convention), and multilateral copyright conventions."'43
The Subafilms court discussed one such multilateral conven-
tion, the Berne Convention,' 'at length. Although the Berne
Convention dates back to 1886, the Umted States did not become
a signatory until 1988.45 "During the 1920's and 1930's there was
a strong interest in the private sector for the adherence of the
Umted States to the Berne Convention because of the increasing
use of American copyrighted works abroad. 46 While the Umted
States resisted Berne Convention memberstup, U.S. authors relied
41. The 1909 Copyright Act and the vast body of state common law are still relevant
as they govern pre-1978 causes of action. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at OV-1.
42. Gary M. Hoffman, Who's Stealing America's Ideas, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at
C3.
These advances hamper enforcement of antipiracy laws, far outpace governments'
ability to respond, and make traditional civil suits largely ineffective as a means
of enforcing intellectual-property rights. Computer networks and personal-
computer use are highly decentralized and virtually impossible to monitor, as is
access to satellite transmissions. Many rights holders have no way of knowing
-when their rights are being infringed.
Id. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.11 (1984)
(discussing how the development of player pianos, photocopiers, television, and audio tape
recorders has forced Congress to alter U.S. copyright law).
43. Jon A. Baumgarten, Primer on the Principles of International Copyright, 15 PRAC.
L. INST. 1, 1 (1993).
44. Berne Convention, supra note 4.
45. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 210; Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Com-
munications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
46. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 211.
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on "back door" access47 to Berne Convention protection by
simultaneously publishing their work m the Umted States and in a
Berne Convention member country.4 Such access relieved some,
but not all, of the pressure on Congress to join the Berne Conven-
tion;49 nonetheless, Congress eventually relented and the Umted
States became a party m 198950 The Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 198851 harmonized U.S. copyright law with
Berne Convention requirements.52
One important principle of the Berne Convention, traceable
to the original 1886 text, is "national treatment" for protected
works.53 Under national treatment, Berne signatories grant authors
who are nationals of other Berne countries the same protection
they accord to their own nationals.5 Thus, Berne Convention
members assure nondiscriminatory treatment to each author within
its borders.
The Subafilms court seized on this principle as one basis for
its decision to disallow an extraterritorial application of U.S.
copyright law.55 The Ninth Circuit emphasized Congress's intent
to fully participate m the Berne Convention.56  The court
reasoned that judicial bypass of the Berne Convention, in this
context, would undermine the signatories' confidence m the
convention.5 7
The prominent role of the Berne Convention and the UCC8
in international copyright enforcement by U.S. authors is clear in
47. The Berne Convention protects works published "simultaneously" (within 30 days
of each other)'in a member and non-member country or state. Berne Convention, supra
note 4, art. 3(i)(b).
48. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 211.
49. Id.
50. U.S. membership to the Berne Convention became effective March 1, 1989. Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 33.
51. Id.
52. "The primary change effected by Berne adherence and the [Berne Convention
Implementation Act] is that the United States has had to sacrifice (or, from the more
enlightened perspective of the rest of the world, to relieve itself of) its obsession with
copyright formalities " 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at OV-6.
53. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 210.
54. Peter Burger, The Berne Conventior Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3
J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (1988).
55. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.),
cert. dented, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994); see infra part III.E.3.
56. Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1097-98.
57. Id.
58. UCC, supra note 5.
1996]
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the wake of the Subaflims limitation of the scope of U.S. copyright
law.59 Prior to Subafilms, U.S. copyright law applied more
frequently. The new restrictive approach of Subafilms requires
copyright holders to seek alternative avenues for relief, including
those available under the Berne Convention and the UCC.
III. THE DOCrRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the doctrine of
contributory imfrmgement in Subafilms is far from novel; in fact, it
marks a return to th6 doctrine's origins. Contributory infringement
is a form of third party liability. Courts employ the doctrine to
reach those actors who play a significant role in copyright infringe-
ment even though their conduct is insufficient to warrant treatment
as primary infringers.
[I]t has long been held that one may be liable for copyright
mfingement even though he has not himself performed the
protected composition. For example, a person who has
promoted or induced the mfrmngmg acts of the performer has
been held jointly and severally liable as a"'vicanous" infringer,
even though he has no actual knowledge that copyright
monopoly is being impaired.6°
A. Early Roots in Patent Law & Joint Tortfeasor Liability
The Ninth Circuit m Subafilms cited copyright law's "historic
kinship" with patent law in discussing the development of 'the
doctrine of contributory infringement.6 In fact, the doctrine has
59. Although the UCC may provide another avenue for relief for copynght holders,
its value as a substitute for subject matter jurisdiction is dubious. Courts frequently have
denied or avoided hearing arguments that the UCC provides an alternative basis for
acquisition of subject matter jurisdiction. See De Bardossy v. Puski, 763 F Supp. 1239,
1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying subject matter jurisdiction under the UCC); Peter Starr
Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (avoiding the
question of whether the UCC alone confers subject matter jurisdiction where copyright law
also confers such junsdiction); P & D Int'l v. Halsey Publishing Co., 672 F Supp. 1429,
1433 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (avoiding the question of whether the UCC alone confers subject
matter jurisdiction where copyright law also confers such jurisdiction).
60. Gershvwn Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-
62 (2d Cir. 1971) (citations omitted) (holding concert managers liable for contributory
infringement because they sponsored local concerts, provided audiences for the concerts,
and knew that featured artists would engage in unauthorized copyrighted performances of
plaintiff's musical compositions).
61. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commumcations Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)).
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roots in both patent law and tort law's enterprise-liability theory.62
An early application of the doctrine arose in the 1886 copyright
infringement case of Harper v. Shoppel.6 The defendant m
Harper made copies of the plaintiff's newspaper printing plate and
sold it to another newspaper, "knowing at the time of selling the
plate that it would be used by the purchaser for printing and
publishing."6' The Harper court held that the defendant "occu-
pies the position of a party acting in concert with the purchaser
who printed and published it, and is responsible as a joint tort-fea-
sor.
" 5
The doctnne arose again at the turn of the century when the
author of Ben Hur brought an action against the Kalem Company
for selling an unauthorized film adaptation of his book.6 Al-
though Kalem did not exhibit the film, the court imposed liability
on Kalem for selling the film with the knowledge that the buyer
would ultimately show the film to the public.67
Contributory infringement also provided the basis for liability
in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co.68 The
defendant m Leeds produced record albums that required the use
of a phonograph patented by the plamtif 69 The defendant was
liable for contributory infringement because Leeds intentionally
supplied these records even though it had not directly infringed any
patent.' The Leeds rule did not remain valid law. Thirty-five
years later, the Supreme Court overturned Leeds in the controver-
sial decision of Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.7
62. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
63. 28 F 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
64. Id at 615.
65. Id.
66. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60 (191i).
67. 1d at 62-63. "The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the
use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story." Id.
68. 213 U.S. 301 (1909).
69. Id at 313.
70. Id. at 311.
71. 320 U.S. 661, 668 (1944).
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), supra, is authority for
the conclusion that he who sells an unpatented part of a combination patent for
use in the assembled machine may be guilty of contributory infringement. The
protection which the Court in that case extended to the phonograph record, which
was an unpatented part of the patented phonograph, is m substance mconsistent
with the view which we have expressed in this case. The rule of Leeds & Catlin
case (No. 2) accordingly must no longer prevail against the defense that a
combination patent is being used to protect an unpatented part from competition.
19961 379
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B. The Supreme Court and Congress Battle Over the Reach of
Contributory Infringement
The doctrine of contributory infringement proved to be a
useful tool for intellectual property right owners; however, in 1931,
the Supreme Court expressed its concerns about litigants using the
doctrine to reinforce anticompetitive practices.72 The Court
focused its attention on the plaintiff's use of patent rights and the
doctrine of contributory mfringement to create and expand
monopolies.
In Carbice v. American Patents Development Corp.,73 the Dry
Ice Corporation sold refrigerator umts to. its customers under the
condition that they only use dry ice as a refrigerant.74 Carbice
manufactured solid carbon dioxide and sold its product to custom-
ers of the Dry Ice Corporation. Dry Ice Corporation claimed such
sales amounted to contributory infrngement and sought to enjoin
Carbice from selling its product to Dry Ice's customers. The
Carbice court rejected the claim of contributory infringement, citing
concerns of anticompetitive monopolization by the Dry Ice
Corporation.75 The Court held that "the attempt to lirmt the
licensee to the use of unpatented materials purchased from the
licensor is comparable to the attempt of a patentee to fix the price
at wuch the patented article may be resold.
7 6
Still concerned about anticompetitive abuses,7 the Supreme
Id. See infra part HLI.B.
72. Carbice v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 32 (1931).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 30.
Solid carbon dioxide has a temperature of about 110 degrees below zero. When
it 'melts,' it passes directly into a dry gaseous state-the gas having a like
temperature and being volume about 500 times that of the solid. These properties
makes the solid dioxide an excellent dry refrigerant for foodstuffs, particularly for
the shipment of ice cream.
Id. at 28-29.
75. Id. at 32.
76. Id
77. Alfred P Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create
"Super" Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or
Copyrighted Software-Related Applications, 4 ALB. LJ. ScI. & TECH. 155, 165 (1994).
Prior to Mercoid, an increasing number of lower courts had expressed the concern
that the contributory infringement doctrine was being used improperly to extend
patent monopoly protection to unpatented goods, thereby constituting patent
misuse. The Supreme Court apparently hearkened to the call of the lower courts
m the Mercoid decision.
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Court, in 1944, inflicted a nearly fatal wound to the doctrine of
contributory infringement. The Court chose Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Investment Co.7" as its vehicle for eliminating the
anticompetitive use of patents. Mercoid involved a patented
heating system consisting in part of a "stoker switch."79 Mercold's
stoker switches had no use other than as a component of the
plaintiff's patented systems.80 The Supreme Court refused to find
primary infringement of the patented heating system because of the
plaintiff's own misuse of the patent.81 The absence of any
primary infringement precluded any claim for contributory
infringement.8' Just as the Subafilms court would do nearly fifty
years later, the Supreme Court refused to allow an action to lie
against a third party when the primary infringer was not liable.
The Supreme Court held:
The result of this decision, together with those which have
preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory
infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to
consider. It is sufficient to say that m whatever posture the
issue may be tendered courts of eqtuty will withhold relief where
the patentee and those claiming under him are using the patent
privilege contrary to the public interest.
8 3
Patent and copyright law diverge at this point m both their
development and application of the doctrine of contributory
infringement. Congress reacted strongly against the Mercoid
holding by passing the Patent Act of 1952,' winch explicitly
provided for contributory patent infringement as a cause of action
and effectively overturned Mercoid.5 This, however, did not
signify the end of the dispute over the reach of contributory
infringement.
The Supreme Court and Congress renewed their struggle over
the limits of contributory infringement in another patent dispute,
78. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
79. Id. at 664.
80. Id.
81. IL at 670.
82. Id. at 667-69.
83. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944).
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)-(d) (1952).
85. Ewert & Donner, supra note 77, at 166; see also Kenneth . Burchfiel, Patent
Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed be the Tie?," 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (1991).
Congress intended "to retreat from Mercoid's condemnation of control of the market in
a nonstaple good used in a patented process as patent misuse." Id.
.1996]
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Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Lattram Corp.6 Prior to the Deepsouth
decision, a court enjoined the defendant from manufacturing
machines in the United States in violation of the plaintiff's
patent.87 In Deepsouth, the defendant sought modification of the
injunction to pernmt overseas sales of the unassembled parts of the
machine for assembly and use abroad.
The Deepsouth court ruled that such conduct by the defendant
did not violate the plaintiff's patent because "[t]he statute makes
it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented
product outside of the United States." The Supreme Court
required underlying infringement before imposing any third party
liability, just as it did in Mercoid and as the Subafilms court would
do twenty years later.
Congress was quick to respond to the Supreme Court's
decision in Deepsouth. In a move similar to the backlash after
Mercoid, Congress reversed the Supreme Court's holding in
Deepsouth with an amendment to the patent statute precluding any
requirement of primary infringement for plaintiffs offering a theory
of contributory patent mfringement.89 As noted in the Subafilms
decision, however, Congress has never adopted an analogous
amendment to the copyright statute.90
Cycles of judicial disapproval, followed by congressional
revitalization, have reshaped the doctrine ofcontributory infnnge-
ment over the years. In Subafilms, the Ninth Circuit fired the
latest salvo in this protracted struggle. Although Congress has not
moved to overturn Subafilms yet, it is constantly pushing for a
broader application of the doctrine of contributory infringement.
91
86. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
87. Id. at 519.
88. Id. at 527.
89. Patent Law Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-622, § 101, 98 Stat. 3383, 3383
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f) (1984)).
90. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 n.7 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
91. Several members of Congress have argued for an expansion of the doctrine for
some time.
The anomalous situation that exists under current law, is that a video dealer who
is found using a black box and two VCR's to make illegal copies would be an
infringer of copyright. A company that manufactures, imports, sells, distributes,
or advertises 10,000 black boxes which will be used to infringe copyright would
likely not be an infringer. That result is neither logical nor good law. It is also
a formula for largescale [sic] copyright violations, and it should be changed.
137 CONG. REC. E1807, 1808 (1991) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman).
[Clurrent copyright law is inadequate to solve the problem. While duplicating a
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Congress has shown a remarkable affinity for overturning any
judicial limitations of the contributory infringement of intellectual
property rights. Observers, therefore, cannot rule out the possibili-
ty of such congressional legislation in the future.
C. Implicit Approval of Contributory Infringement in the 1976
Copyright Act
With the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act,' Congress
implicitly approved the long standing common law doctnne of
contributory infringement.' It did so by adding the phrase "to
authorize" use of a work as an indisputable right of a copyright
holder. Although Congress has never expressly codified the
doctrine of contributory copyhght infringement, the Subaflims
court construed the addition of the words "to authorize" to
indicate congressional acceptance of the doctrine.94 Section 106
of the Copyright Act describes the rights of copyright holders as
follows:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4)
and in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and (5) m the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works to
copy protected movie amounts to copyright infringement, the contributory
infringer can often escape liability. The sad truth is that unless we provide a real
weapon to effectively battle video pirates, we will not be able to halt the flood of
bootleg videotapes.
137 CONG. REC. S6035-01,6066 (1991) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl). See also 139 CONG.
REC. E27-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes advocating the extension of U.S.
copyright infringement to broadcasters who authorize retransmission of a copyrighted
work).
92. Copyright Act. of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1992).
93. H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), repnnted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5674.
94. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe'Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088,1092 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
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display the copyrighted work publicly.95
Section 501 further provides:
(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 is
an infringer of the copyright
(b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a
copyright is entitled to institute an action for any mfrimge-
ment of any particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it.
9 6
The Copyright Act did not result m a uniform application of
the doctrine. Indeed, the addition of the words "to authorize"
marked the beginning of the modem debate over the doctrine of
contributory infringement.
D. The Initial Interpretation of Contributory Infringement m the
Context of the 1976 Copyright Act
The initial interpretation of the words "to authorize" was
inconsistent with the origins of contributory infringement. The
earliest applications of the doctrine rejected any use of
contributory imfrmgement to find a party liable m the absence of
direct infringement.'
1. Peter Starr-The Stolen Film Prints
The Subafilms court expressly rejected one such iutial
interpretation-Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental
Films' The facts of Peter Starr are nearly identical to those
presented in Subafilms. In 1980 Starr created and copyrighted a
film entitled Take It to the Limit.99 Three years later, he autho-
rized an agent to explore the possibility of distributing the film m
Europe."° One European distributor made an offer for the rights
to the film, but Starr rejected it.1 After this rejection, the
distributor surreptitiously obtained a print of Take It to the Limit
95. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (l)-(5) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 501 (a)-(b).
97. Carbice v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
98. 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
99. id. at 1441.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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from its London custodian.) 2 The distributor reproduced and
distributed the film -on video in Europe.103 As a result of this
unauthorized distribution, another European distributor backed out
of a pending deal with Starr.t°4
Starr brought suit in 1984."°5 The district court for the
Central District of Califorma dismissed the claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction." 6 Starr appealed in 1986 and the Ninth
Circuit found an act of infringement and reversed the decision.'t 7
The court ruled that the execution of an agreement within the
United States to exhibit a film abroad was actionable under
sections 106 and 501 of U.S. copyright law because it violated the
copyright holder's exclusive right "to authorize.
1Y'
This result differed from early applications of the doctrine of
contributory infringement because the actual exhibition authorized
in Peter Starr was not an infringement actionable under U.S.
copyright law. Because the exhibition was to occur abroad, no
primary infringement supported third party liability.' 9 Imposi-
tion of third party liability by the court in Peter Starr violated a
general principle of third party liability.
2. Lewis Galoob-The Video Game "Cheating" Device
Six years later, in Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of
America,"' the Ninth Circuit revisited the interpretation of the
troublesome phrase-"to authorize." In Lewis Galoob, a case
factually similar to Peter Starr and Subafilms, one party authorized
conduct alleged to be a direct copyright infrmgement.11 The
dispute in Lewis Galoob involved a device known as the "Game
Geme," manufactured by the defendant; Galoob.1
2
The Game Geme's sole purpose was to allow video game
102. Id.
103. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir.
1986).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. kdL
108. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (9th Cir.
1986).
109. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1988).
110. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
ill. d at 967.
112. Id.
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players to alter the features of video games for use with the
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES). Players insert their
Nintendo game cartridges into the Game Geme, which in turn
inserts into the NES."4 The Game Geme blocked certain data
from being exchanged between the cartridges and the system."'
This allowed players to increase their number of "lives," vary the
speed at which they move, and modify other features. 1 6  The
Game Geme did not permanently alter the data stored in the
cartridges.
1 7
Copyright law protected the cartridges themselves as an
audiovisual work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6);"' however, the
district court held that the Game Geme was not a derivative work
because it merely enhances the audiovisual display and creates no
independent work."9 The district court similarly found that the
displays created by the Game Geme constituted "fair use"' 20 and,
thus, were not an infringement of Nintendo's copyright."' Each
of these findings, was fatal to Nintendo's claim because they
precluded any finding by the court of an underlying act of
infringement. Without a claim of primary infringement, the
contributory claim was untenable.
The Lewis Galoob analysis differed significantly from that in
Peter Starr While the Lewis Galoob court recogmzed that
"infringement by authorization is a form of direct infnnge-
ment,"'" the Peter Starr court focused instead on the underlying
conduct." The Lewis Galoob court held "a party cannot
authorize [within the meaning of U.S. copyright law] another party
to infringe a copyright unless the authorized conduct would itself
113. 1l at 965.
114. Id. at 967.
115. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.
1992).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 965.
119. The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this finding. Id. at 968.
120. "The doctrine of fair use allows a holder of the privilege to use copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without the consent of the copyright holder." Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964. F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Narrell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989)).
121. Id
122. ld. at 970.
123. Id.
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be unlawful."124 The Lewis Galoob court found support for this
proposition from two important sources: the video tape recorder
controversy in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc." and the oft-quoted treatise of Professor
Nimmer. 26
In Sony, the Supreme Court employed an analysis on which
the Subafilms court would rely in overturning Peter Starr Sony
involved a suit against the manufacturer of video tape recorders.
The copyright holder claimed the purchasers of the recorders were
recording its works."V The copyright holder accuse'd Sony of
contributing to the infringement of its copynght.'18 The Ninth
Circuit found Sony liable for damages based of its marketing of the
recorders.' 29
The Supreme Court, however, required a finding of direct
infringement by the consumer before it could impose any form of
third party liability upon Sony.3 ' Ultimately, the Court did not
hold Sony liable because it found the consumers' conduct to be
primarily noncommercial in nature and, therefore, not in violation
of the copyright holder's exclusive right to use.131  In Sony, the
Supreme Court relied upon a basic principle of third party liability,
the same rationale that produced the Mercoid and Deepsouth
decisions.
Additionally, the Lewis Galoob court found support from
Professor Nimmer's treatise, a source on which the Ninth Circuit
would later rely in Subafilms.13 According to Professor Nimmer,
"to the extent that an activity does not violate one of those five
enumerated rights [see 17 U.S.C. § 106], authorizing such activity
does not constitute"copyright infringement."' 3 The Sony and
Lewis Galoob cases, therefore, set the stage for the reversal of
Peter Starr
124. Id.
25. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
126. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35.
127. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 420.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 433.
131. Id. at 442 (holding that use of videotape recorders by consumers to "time shift"
their viewing of broadcasts constitutes "fair use" and thus, such taping by consumers could
not form the requisite direct infringement needed to find contributory infringement).
132. Lewis Galoob Toys, v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 12.04 [A][3](a), at 12-85 n.82.
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3. Danlaq-The James Bond Movie Controversy
Although not specifically mentioned in Lewis Galoob, the
decision in Danjaq v. MGM/UA Communications, Co."3 ar-
ticulated an essential link in the reasoning employed in Subaflims.
The Danjaq decision also foreshadowed the Subafilms holding that
would follow three years later. The Danjaq controversy stemmed
from an alleged "fire sale" of James Bond movies m the world
market.1 35 The propriety of the sale itself was not at issue;
however, the plaintiff and copyright holder Danjaq argued that the
extremely low sale price reduced the value of the copyright
holder's property and, thus, violated the defendant's fiduciary duty
to the copyright holder.'36
In Danjaq, the plaintiff alleged the defendant's conduct
amounted to third party infringement, but failed to specify any
primary infringement. 37 The plaintiff alleged liability on the
basis of the defendant's mere "'authorization of public performance
of Bond films." 8 Such performance was to occur wholly abroad,,
which proved fatal to a finding of liability.139 The district court
in Danjaq expressly rejected any distinction between "a private
performance of a motion picture in the Umted States and a public
performance overseas.""
The copyright owner is not vested with the exclusive right either
to do or to authorize private or overseas performances
Private performances of motion pictures are not actionable
because the Congress had failed to include such performances
among the list of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. In the
same manner, overseas performances are not actionable because
the Congress has not chosen to enforce the U.S. copyright laws
extraterntonally.14'
134. 773 F Supp. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
135. lt at 195. The defendants sought to raise a large amount of capital very quickly
by holding a "fire sale," flooding the European video market with James Bond movies for
sale at prices well below market value. Id.
136. Id.
137. 1d at 200.
138. Id.
139. Danjaq v. MGM/UA Communications, Co., 773 F Supp. 194,203 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Generally, there is no liability for acts of infringement occurring wholly outside the U.S.
territory. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1988).
140. Danjaq, 773 F Supp. at 203.
141. Id
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Similarly, the Subafilms court expressly rejected any differenti-
ation between an act not enumerated under section 106 and an act
that occurs wholly abroad. 42 Both are beyond the reach of U.S.
copyright law and, thus, the distinction is one without significance.
The requirement of direct infringement in Lewis Galoob and
Sony will prove to be wise in the long run because it prevents the
anomalous result of holding a contributory infringer liable where
a primary infringer could not similarly be held liable. In the
context of international relations, the Lewis Galoob and Sony
analysis is preferable because it reduces potential friction between
application of U.S. copyright law and international copyright
agreements. The Peter Starr approach is appealing at first glance
because it provides relief to aggrieved copyright holders; however,
a closer examination reveals that it fails to leave any role for the
Berne Convention or other multilateral agreements. Such
agreements become meaningless if the Umted States can disregard
them at will. If a prominent member, such as the Umted States,
can ignore these agreements and their precepts, there will be no
incentive for other countries to adhere to such agreements. U.S.
courts must recognize this fact and exercise restraint.
The Peter Starr approach also fails to appreciate the limits of
U.S. copyright law. Congress never intended U.S. copyright law to
function as the sole and exclusive remedy for foreign infringement.
If Congress assented to this view, it would not have gone to such
pains to modify existing law to accede to the Berne Convention
and other multilateral agreements. Furthermore, Congress has the
power to create a distinct form of liability, independent of primary
infringement, and did so after the Mercoid and Deepsouth
decisions. In light of its flurry of action following these two
decisions, congressional maction m tis area is the strongest
support for the proposition that courts should adhere to the
traditional application of the doctrine of contributory mfrngement.
This will remain true unless Congress acts again. For these
reasons, the Lewis Galoob and Sony approach is more sensible
'than that of Peter Starr
142. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commumcations Co., 24 F.3d 1088,1091 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
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E. Contributory Infringement. Reexamined in Subafilms
The Ninth Circuit granted Subafilms a rehearing in order to
resolve the inconsistencies between Peter Starr, Sony, and Lewis
Galoob The ultimate decision in Subafilms rested upon three
themes. First, any application of contributory infringement must
be consistent with principles of third party liability--contributory
infringement should not lie where there is no primary infringement.
Second, the Subafilms requirement of underlying mfrimgement
cannot be circumvented by extratermtorial application of U.S.
copyright law without an amendment to the copyright statute.
Third, there must be a recognition that national treatment is the
best resolution for international copyright disputes that occur
wholly abroad.
1. No Third Party Liability Without Primary -Infringement
The Ninth Circuit's review of Subafilms entailed a
reexamination of the third party liability analysis developed m
Peter Starr In Subafilms, MGM authorized Warner Brothers to
distribute Yellow Submarine m the overseas market.143  During
argument, MGM conceded that this authorization occurred within
the United States.1" Relying on. Peter Starr, the court found that
an act of infringement occurred within the Umted States and that
this act consisted of a mere authonzation. 145
The Ninth Circuit extensively reviewed past interpretations of
the doctrine of contributory infringement. In examining congres-
sional intent, the court found that Congress, in adding the phrase
"to authorize" to the copyright statute, did not intend to create a
new form of liability apart from a violation of the enumerated
rights.
146
The exclusive rights accorded to a copyright owner under
section 106 are "to do and to authorize" any of the activities
specified m the five numbered clauses. Use of the phrase "to
authorize" is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability
of contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully
143. Id. at 1089.
144. Id. at 1090 n.3.
145. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., Nos. 91-56248, 91-56379,91-
56289, 1993 WL 39269, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993), vacated in part, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th
Cir.), cert. dented, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
146. Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1092.
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acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an
infringer if he or she engages in the business of rentmg it to
others for purposes of unauthorized public performance.147
To interpret congressional intent, the Ninth Circuit once again
turned to Professor Nimmer's treatise. The court held "that 'to
authorize' was simply a convenient peg on which Congress chose
to hang the antecedent jurisprudence of third party liability." 4 '
The Ninth Circuit's requirement of underlying infringement is
consistent with the Lewis Galoob and Sony decisions. No
significant distinctions exist between those cases and Subafilms that
would warrant any other application of the law. Each of the three
cases involved a primary actor who was not mfrngmg a copynght.
There is no basis, therefore, to hold a third party liable for
"contributory infringement." The Peter Starr rationale was
anomalous, and the Ninth Circuit correctly reversed it in Subafilms.
2. Foreign Conduct is not Primary Infingement
The Subafilms decision precluded extraterritorial application
of U.S. copyright law to wholly foreign conduct. 49  The
Subafilms court stated that any extraterrtorial application of U.S.
copyright law
might well send the signal that the United States does not
believe that the protection accorded by the laws of other
member nations is adequate, which would undermine two other
objectives of Congress in joining the convention: "strengthening
the credibility of the U.S. position in trade negotiations with
countries where piracy is not uncommon" and "raising the
likelihood that other nations will enter the Convention."'
50
The Subafilms court recognized a long-standing presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in general and
147. H.R. RE' No. 1476, supra note 93.
148. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093 (quoting 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at 12-84
n.81).
149. A possibility remains that a foreign court could chose to apply U.S. copyright law
in its own court under choice of laws provisions. See Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech
Sys. Pte, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696,702-03 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that if U.S. courts can entertain
actions under foreign copyright law, there is no reason why the foreign courts could not
apply U.S. law). *
150. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097-98 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994) (quoting S. REP. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-N,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3709-10).
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copyright law in particular."' -Tis result was startling because,
prior to the Subafilms decision, parties in the United States were
liable under the doctrine of contributory infringement even in cases
where those directly responsible for the infringement remained
outside the reach of U.S. copyright law.5  Before the Subafilms
decision, U.S. copyright holders successfully used this method to
enforce their rights. abroad without relying on international law for
protection. The conclusion that U.S. copyright law is inapplicable
beyond U.S. borders is fundamental to the Subafilms decision.
The plaintiffs in Subafilms argued that U.S. copyright law
should apply to conduct abroad where infringement results in
"adverse effects within the Umted States."'53 Such an extension
of the law would result in a finding of underlying infringement to
support a claim of contributory infringement. Such a "domestic
effects" test would result in a finding of underlying mfrmngement m
a majority of cases. Fortunately, the court flatly rejected this
argument."5  The Subafilms court was "unwilling to overturn
over eighty years of consitent jurisprudence on the extraterritorial
reach of the copyright laws without further guidance from
Congress."' 55 The court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's
"long-standing principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' "s156
The Ninth Circuit's abstention from extraterritonal application
of U.S. copyright law gave teeth to the Subafilms decision. It
closed a potential loophole that threatened to swallow the
Subafilms rule requiring domestic infringement. It- also sent a clear
signal to Congress that further legislation is necessary before the
judiciary will expand the application of U.S. copyright law beyond
U.S' borders. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit selected a path that
balances a healthy respect for foreign laws and international
treaties while retaining a strong protection .scheme for true
151. Id. at 1098.
152. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that execution of an agreement within the United States violated copyright
holders' exclusive right "to authorize" as described in the 1976 Copyright Act and thus
constituted infringing conduct).
153. Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1095.
154. Id. at 1098.
155. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.),
cert. dente4 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
156. Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
[Vol. 18:371
The Doctrine of Contributory Infringement
domestic copyright infringement.
3. National Treatment is the Best Resolution of Internatibnal
Copyright Infringement Claims
The Subafilms court emphasized the principle of national
treatment as part of its rationale for not applying U.S. copyright
law outside its borders. The court held "that 'the primary
mechanism for discouraging discriminatory treatment of foreign
copyright claimants is the principle of national treatment,' and
that adherence to [the] Berne [Convention] will require 'careful
due regard for the values' of other member nations."'"7  The
practical effect of implementmg the national treatment principle is
that an adhering country pledges to treat foreign works the same
way it treats national works.158
National treatment is a central theme to both the UCC and
the Berne Convention. 9  Essentially, protection based on
national treatment has two components m the context of intellectu-
al property protection: the nationality of the author and the
country or state where a work is first published. 16° The first
component of the pnnciple confers eligibility for protection based
on the nationality of the author in an adhering state. 6 1 The
second component confers eligibility for protection based on first
publication in an adhering state.162
National treatment ensures some level of protection for
authors in the international community without attempting the
herculean task of imposing a single uniform set of rules on its
members. Because an author chooses the country or state of first
publication, he has some measure of control as to how much
protection his work will receive. The Berne Convention bars
members from affording foreign works less protection than they
afford to national works.'6 Thus, the Berne Convention assures
nondiscriminatory treatment with minimal intrusion into how each
157. Id at 1097 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 609,100th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1988), regarding
adherence to the Berne Convention).
158. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 218.
159. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994). See also DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 210.
160. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 218.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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individual member chooses to protect national works.'6
The Subafilms decision respects the principle of national
treatment and allows the Berne Convention to operate as intended,
rather than imposing U.S. law on other countries."l  The
Subafilms decision is consistent with the goals of national treat-
ment-strong intellectual property right protection accompanied by
ease of adminstration.
66
In the future, copyright holders-victmized by wholly foreign
infringement-will receive the same protection as citizens of the
infringing country rather than relying on the Umted States to act
as-the copyright police of the world. Thus, the Subafilms decision
relieves the United States of a substantial burden and drain of
resources. Meanwhile, other countries will freely share in the
responsibility of creating a strong worldwide protection scheme for
intellectual property. A system born out of consensus is preferable
to one imposed by U.S. strong-arm techniques. The final product
of such a consensus will be sturdier and more efficient in the long
run. The Subafilms decision recognizes that the United States is
only one member among many in the international community and
that the effects of extraterritonal judicial intervention are not
always desirable.
IV ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AFTER SUBAFILMS
The Subafilms decision deprives copyright holders of a cause
of action even where the foreign infringing conduct would violate
164. Some would argue that this is in fact a shortcoming of the protection scheme. See
Hoffman, supra note 42.
165. For a different point of view, see Curb, v. MCA Records, 898 F Supp. 586, 596
(M.D. Tenn. 1995) (expressly rejecting the Subaflims approach).
The Court is sensitive to the sovereignty and rule of law in other countries. Such
sensitivity is only enhanced by the recognition of the United States' obligation
under multilateral treaties such as the 1971 Geneva Phonograms Convention and
the recently adopted TRIPS component of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. However, a careful exercise of domestic jurisdiction is consistent with the
approach of the leading treatise in the field of international copyright law: a U.S.
court, for example, could grant injunctive remedies under U.S. law for acts that
commence a course of infringing conduct m the United States, for example, acts
of authorizing or copying, without regard for whether eventual exploitation is to
take place at home or abroad. Such an injunction would be justifiable if it
forestalled piracy, whether at home or abroad, but did not risk interfering with
such relief as might be granted under foreign laws for exploitation abroad. Geller
& Nimmer, supra, § 3 [b][ii] at INT-51-52.
ld. at 596.
166. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3
J.L. & TECH. 1, 9-10 (1988).
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U.S. law if performed domestically or where the acts are illegal
under the laws of the country where the violation takes place.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has left copyright holders some
remedies and maneuvering room m formulating their legal theories.
U.S. copyright holders who find themselves m the same
position as the plaintiffs rn Subafilms might successfully make a
policy argument if supported by the right set of facts. Such
litigants could' argue "that it is unfair to hold a person liable under
the laws of this nation for acts done abroad, except when those acts
are intended to, and do, have an effect within the United
States."' 7 Such a "domestic effects" argument, although rejected
in Subafilms," nght carry favor with the court if the plaintiff
produced hard evidence rather than conjecture and general
allegations. Therc are several other alternative strategies that may
aid a plaintiff should this policy based argument fail.
A. The Predicate Act Doctrine
The manner in which a plaintiff characterizes the defendant's
conduct is essential in light of the Subafilms decision. For
example, the act of licensing occurring within the Umted States-m
the absence of more activity-Nfill probably not be sufficient to
trigger U.S. copyright law. A plaintiff, however, may characterize
the act of licensing combined with circumstantial evidence of
further domestic acts as "preparation" and thus trigger direct
liability. 69  Similarly, domestic authorization of "attempted"
foreign infringement nght survive the harsh rule of Subafilms.17°
The holding of Subaflms mandates the existence of primary
infringement to sustain the miposition of liability for contributory
infringement; however, the courts never have required a plaintiff
to name or even specifically identify the primary infringer."'
Thus, the failure of a plaintiff to find a defendant amenable to suit
167. GB Mktg. USA, Inc. v. Gerolstemer Brunner GmbH & Co., 782 F Supp. 763,773
(W.D.N.Y. 1991).
168. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994). The plaintiff's "parade of.horribles" consisting of a
general allegation that foreign distribution of the film resulted in "adverse effects" within
the United States simply did not persuade the court. Id.
169. Smith, supra note 34, at 582-83.
170. The Subafflms court expressly avoided the question whether "liability might attach
when a party authorizes an act that could constitute copyright infringement, but the
'attempted' infringement fails.". Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1094 n.8.
171. Danjaq v. MGM/UA Communications, Co., 773 F Supp. 194,201 (C.D. Cal. .1991).
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for a claim of primary infringement is not fatal to a case of
contributory infringement against a third party.
The dispute in Subafilms centered around the "authorization"
of acts occurring wholly abroad. The plaintiffs in the Subafilms
argued unsuccessfully that such authorization necessarily included
the duplication of originals within the United States for distribution
abroad.' Plaintiffs wishing to remove themselves from the harsh
rule of Subafilms should adduce evidence at trial sufficient to show,
at-a mnimum, that the defendants were involved in preparatory
activities within the Umted States. 73 This theory of infringement
is the predicate act theory. The Ninth Circuit has not expressly
rejected application of U.S. copyright law based on the "predicate
act" theory. 4  In Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing,'" the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used the copyrighted printing
plates domestically to reproduce a work.176 The defendants failed
to allege m their pleadings or discovery that reproduction or other
predicate acts occurred outside of the United States.'" Conse-
quently, the court refused to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 7 "
The Subafilms court did not foreclose predicate act-based
junsdiction-m its holding. Becauie the Subafilms court found that
the only domestic act was a "mere authorization," the Ninth Circuit
might accept the Update Art rule and apply U.S. copyright law to
foreign conduct.
The Update Art rule for predicate acts is limited in scope.
Robert Stigwood Group v. O'Reilly79 demonstrates the lower
limit of the predicate act doctrine. In Stigwood, Roman Catholic
priests infringed the plaintiff's copyright by performing, without
authorization, the rock opera Jesus Christ Superstar m Canada.'8s
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants assembled and arranged
172. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Cb., 24 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
173. Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, 201 F Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(holding thar preparation within the United States followed by acts abroad that infringe a
U.S. copyright will result in direct liability under joint tortfeasor theory).
174. Smith, supra note 34, at 583; see also Danlaq, 773 F Supp. at 200-01.
175. 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988).
176. Ia4 at 68-69.
177. Id. at 73.
178. Id
179. 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
180. Id at 1097.
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in the United States all necessary elements to the performance and
then simply crossed the border.'81 The court found this type of
activity insufficient for predicate act-based application of U.S.
copyright law."l The Stigwood court stated that only infringe-
ment that pernuts further reproduction abroad triggers application
of U.S. copyright law and may justify imposing a constructive trust
to capture foreign profits.1t 3
B. State Law Claims
Infringement claims generally do not arise in the absence of
some commercial relationship. Ift under the rule of Subafilms, a
plaintiff is unable to bring a U.S. copyright law claim, such a
relationship could form the basis for a variety of state law
claims." If there is an underlying contract, such as a licensing
agreement, a claim for breach of contract or fiduciary duty might
be justified.
Authority also exists for imposing a constructive trust against
a defendant's extraterritorial profits derived from a domestic act of
infringement when that act permits further reproduction of the
copyrighted material abroad." The plaintiff, however, has the
difficult task of bringing forth evidence of a domestic act.
C. Application of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts
Authority also exists for the application of foreign copyright
law in U.S. courts." The usefulness of such a remedy would
necessarily depend on the degree of protection the foreign
jurisdiction affords. Moreover, even if foreign laws gave strong
protection, U.S. courts are not under any obligation to hear such
claims. Indeed, at least one district court has declined to hear a
foreign copyright law claim, relying on the doctrine of forum non
convemens as well as the absence of an "urgent reason" to "enter
181. Id. at 1100.
182. Id. at 1101.
183. Id.
184. Smith, supra note 34, at 583.
185. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F Supp. 1345, 1351-52 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Robert
Stigwood Group v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1988).
186. London Film Prods. v. Intercontinental Communications, 580 F Supp. 47, 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (accepting jurisdiction over a foreign copyright infringement action).
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the bramble bush of ascertaining and applying foreign law."1' 7
D. Multilateral Treaty or International Agreement
The copyright holder may also turn to a multilateral treaty- or
international agreement, such as the Berne Convention or the
UCC, for relief. Both of these international agreements rely on
national treatment and, agam,-the level of protection depends upon
the strength of the foreign country's copyright law. If the work is
eligible for protection under the international agreement, the
copyright holder must follow certain procedures in order to secure
protection.'m Finally, if an eligible work has successfully secured
protection, it remains to be seen what actual rights are available
and for what duration.189
V CONCLUSION
Video piracy in the international market is extremely costly to
the United States."9 Although the U.S. government has taken
steps to curtail the problem, each anti-piracy measure seems to
spawn a new "cottage industry of pirates dedicated to developing
devices that defeat these technologies."19' The extent of the
problem remains serious. U.S. copyright holders, including the film
industry, ,recording artists and television producers, are closely
momtoring cases like Subafilms, wich deplete the arsenal of legal
weapons available to combat worldwide piracy of U.S. works.
The doctrine of contributory infringement is a potentially
powerful legal tool to redress infringement of U.S. copyrights. U.S.
copyright holders may consider treating the doctrine of
contributory infringement as a cure-all for their woes; however,
they should not use the doctrine as one of unlimited application.
Contributory hifrngement is not a weapon to wield without regard
for its effect on international relations. If the Umted States desires
to apply the doctrine of contributory infringement actively in the
187. rsI T.V Prod. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F Supp. 854, 866 (E.D.
Cal. 1992).
188. The UCC and Berne Convention differ considerably as to what procedures are
necessary to invoke protection. Baumgarten, supra note 43, at 3.
189. DuBoff et al., supra note 36, at 219.
190. The.Motion Picture Association of America asserts that "domestic piracy costs the
industry more than $600 million annually, while foreign copying costs more than $1.2
billion each year." 137 CONG. REC. 6035, 6066 (1991).
191. Id.
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context of international claims, it should withdraw from multilateral
agreements such as the Berne Convention.
One cannot overstate the importance of U.S. membership to
the Berne Convention and other multilateral treaties. The United-
States is more than a mere member. Its membership signals to the
rest of the world that it believes m the principles embodied m the
Berne Convention. In the context of copyright treaties, U.S.
membersip sends a strong signal of its conmutment to internation-
al intellectual property protection.
The Subafilms court favored copyright protection that
conforms to the norms established by international treaties over
arbitrary U.S. judicial intervention. Had Subafilms come out
differently and allowed extraterrtorial application of U.S. copyright
law, it would have been a clear message to the international
commumty that the Umted States does not respect the treaties it
has ratified or the principles reflected therein.
Disregarding treaties to which the Umted States is a member
defeats the very purpose for which it joined them: to further
stability in the international community. The greater good of a
strengthened international intellectual property scheme that
benefits all the world's authors, including those in the Umted
States, far outweighs the sacrifice of leaving a handful of authors
in the Umted States without a domestic remedy for infringement.
Jeffrey Lewis*
J.D. candidate, Loyola Law School, 1996; B.A., University of California, Santa
Barbara, 1992. I dedicate this Comment to my family for their constant love and support.
I wish to thank Geoffrey Moore, Gregory Townsend, and the Journal staff, who
contributed to this Comment.
1995] 399

